Institutional brokerage rates have been in decline. We investigate whether this reduction has coincided with a fall in benefits provided by brokers to institutional asset managers. We use trade packages from both active and passive equity funds from 1995 to 2001, and active equity funds from 2002 to 2010. We find that later period active funds recoup a combined 1.75 basis point benefit (from price impact cost recovery and short-term alpha) per basis point of brokerage cost. Later period active investors saw improved trade price impact and shorter-term alpha net benefits, relative to earlier period active investors. These results are robust after controlling for trade characteristics and cross-sectional variation over time. Our findings suggest brokers innovate to provide valuable services in the subsequent, lower brokerage environment.
Introduction
We find that brokers enable active equity managers to trade at favorable prices. We measure this advantage in two ways. First, higher brokerage payments are associated with lower price impact from trading. Second, higher brokerage is associated with better post-trade marketadjusted returns. Our evidence suggests that brokers create value both through improving trade execution, as well as through a range of services that enhance investment choice. This effect has become more pronounced recently, as brokerage rates (as a percent of trade value) have fallen.
The assessment of brokerage costs and benefits is challenging. Payments to brokers are relatively clear; they are explicit and made when trades occur. However, benefits received from brokers are varied, difficult to quantify, and dispersed through time (e.g. transaction services, access to research reports, access to analysts, security allocations in primary market transactions, etc.). Past research comparing brokerage benefits to costs has typically focused on comparing brokerage payments to trade price impact. These studies suggest that brokerage costs exceed trade price impact benefits. Hence these authors conclude that there may be other benefits provided by brokers, but do not attempt to catalog or measure these contributions. 1 We investigate the relation between brokerage costs, implicit trading costs and marketadjusted returns (alpha) using two sample periods of fund manager trades: active and passive fund trades from 1995 to 2001 (period 1 or 'P1'); and active fund trades from 2002 to 2010 (period 2 or 'P2') on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). These two samples cover a period of time that saw significant technological change in the trading environment, as well as marked reductions in percentage brokerage costs.
We have detailed information for brokerage costs. Calculating benefits from employing brokers is more complex. One key possible benefit to fund managers from brokers would be lower price impact of trades. Hence we use price impact measures to assess non-brokerage (implicit) trading costs incurred by our sample funds. Of course, brokers provide their clients services other than transaction assistance. Rather than attempt to list other possible broker services, and measure their associated benefits, we focus on the post-trade investment performance of each trade package and investigate its relation to the brokerage that was paid.
Specifically, we compute 20-day (short-run) and 20-day to 1-year (long-run) market-adjusted returns subsequent to each trade package and estimate the relation between brokerage costs and post-trade alphas. Associating broker benefits with particular trades is difficult -the broker who processes the trade may not have provided the relevant non-trade services supporting this transaction. Hence, we assume that higher brokerage payments are associated with transactions that generate higher alpha.
Consistent with other studies, we find that estimated price impact improvement cannot, by itself, justify paying higher brokerage rates. However, when we include estimated post-trade investment performance, then higher brokerage payments appear to provide benefits that exceed brokerage costs. The net gain to brokerage has become more apparent recently, as brokerage costs (relative to trade value) have fallen.
We find that brokerage costs have halved and turnover increased tenfold during our entire sample period (including both P1 and P2). Over this time there has been little change in the market shares of brokers -consistent with these changes to costs and turnover being technologically driven, rather than a consequence of a major change in the competitive environment of the brokerage industry.
Our regression analysis shows that passive (defined to be index and enhanced index funds) funds experience lower implicit (non-brokerage) transaction costs when greater percentage brokerage is paid during P1. Active funds earn higher long-term alpha, but have statistically insignificant differences in implicit transaction costs when higher brokerage is paid during P1. With falling brokerage rates in the second (P2) sample, we find that active funds have reduced implicit transaction costs and increased short-term alpha for higher brokerage paid. These results are robust using Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional analysis and an analysis of the residuals from the baseline regression. During the recent decline in brokerage rates benefits from brokerage services are more than commensurate with brokerage paid.
The study is structured as follows: Section 2 provides background and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the data used and develops our empirical method. Section 4 reports our results and Section 5 concludes.
Background and Hypotheses Development
Several papers demonstrate that paying higher brokerage costs does not necessarily result in commensurately lower implicit transaction costs. For example, Berkowitz, Logue and Noser (1988) find a one basis point increase in brokerage paid is associated with only a 0.23 basis point decrease in price impact (measured as the difference in the traded price relative to Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) that day). This suggests an uneconomic net incremental benefit to paying higher brokerage. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) and ComertonForde et al. (2005) find little association between trade price impact and brokerage paid.
A possible explanation for these results is that brokers provide benefits other than execution services. That is, an incomplete account of benefits provided by brokers may obscure the relation between brokerage paid and benefits received. Examples of additional benefits include analytic services, broker research, IPO allocations (e.g. Nimalendran, Ritter and Zhang (2007) ; Goldstein, Irvine and Puckett (2011) ) and soft dollar benefits (e.g. Blume (1993) and Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2001) ).
Rather than listing and valuing possible ancillary benefits, we focus on the consequences of employing additional services. That is, if these bundled brokerage services are associated with improved stock selection or portfolio construction (e.g. Womack (1996) , Barber et al. (2001) , Aitken, Muthuswamy and Wong (2001) and Kadan et al. (2009) In assessing the value brokers create for active investors we need to recognize that our sample periods contain events related to the 2003 Global Settlement.
2 Broker firm actions noted in the Global Settlement may not have been consistent with providing long-term benefits to investors from some bundled services (e.g. stock research). Almost all penalized firms are major brokers in Australia (see Jackson (2005) ) and have changed their practices since the Global Settlement. Hence, in the period subsequent to the announcement of the Global Settlement there may have been a shift from bundling to pure execution services for active funds. This could be due a reduction in the demand or supply of broker research (partly as a result of Global Settlement (e.g. Kelly and Ljungqvist (2007) ) and/or improved trading technologies, which bring a focus to transactions services. Whether a lower brokerage environment results in a stronger relation between brokerage and implicit transaction costs is unclear. Even with lower overall brokerage rates, there may be a stronger link between these payments and the quality of transaction services. This motivates our final hypothesis:
H3: The brokerage and implicit transaction cost relation for active funds is stronger in P2 than in P1.
Data and Approach

Data
Our two samples use daily institutional trades recorded in the Portfolio Analytics Database (PAD). PAD is a privately constructed database for academic research that was compiled using an 'invitation' approach to the largest Australian equity managers in Australia, 
Trade Packages and Broker Trade Packages
Institutions may spread their transactions (from a single trade decision) across time to reduce price impact; i.e. they may package a trade decision into a series of transactions. Hence, we follow the approach of Chan and Lakonishok (1995) to identify and consolidate these trade packages. A buy (sell) transaction is considered part of a trade package if there is less than a five-day gap from the previous purchase (sale) of the stock. Further, each trade package is decomposed into trade packages handled by a specific broker to form broker trade packages.
Hence, a broker trade package consolidates purchases (sales) by the same broker occurring within five days.
Implicit Transaction Costs and Alpha
We use two measures of implicit transaction costs: Price Impact and Trade to VWAP.
We follow Chan and Lakonishok (1995) 
ClosingPrice t is the last trade price on the day the final trade in a package is executed.
ClosingPrice t+20 and ClosingPrice t+254 are dividend and split adjusted stock closing prices 20
and 254 days after the end of the trade package. Market t , Market t+20 and Market t+254 are the value of the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index at the end of, 20 days after the end of, and 254 days after the end of a trade package, respectively.
Note that PriceImpact (TradetoVWAP), ExcessReturns t+20 , and ExcessReturns t+254 measures are intentionally structured so that the time periods for each do not overlap. Hence, we are able to track benefits to brokerage paid from the start of the trade package to one year after the end of the package. 
The Model
Our focus is on differences in performance (alpha and implicit transaction costs of trades) between active and passive funds, and between P1 active and P2 active funds. We want to see whether active managers use brokerage services differently than passive managers, and whether these differences allow active managers to mitigate adverse price impacts from their potentially informed trades.
We begin by relating implicit transaction costs (defined either as Price Impact or Trade to VWAP) and alphas of a trade package at the fund/broker level to basic characteristics of the order, prevailing market conditions and the style of the fund manager. Hence we specify the following regression model for transactions by fund f in stock i, using broker b, where each broker / trade package constitutes an observation:
Where Performance is each of the alpha or transaction cost measures given in equations 1 through 4. γ f and α i denote fund and stock style fixed effects, respectively. These and other explanatory variables are defined in the Appendix.
The basic model outlined in equation (5) is constructed relying on explanatory variables from the literature. For example, Chiyachantana et al. (2004) use Cap, Complex, Days, Market and Volatility. Brokerage, our variable of interest, is used by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) in their price impact regressions. Lagflow is taken from papers examining fund flows and mutual fund performance (e.g. Alexander, Cici and Gibson (2007) ). Relying on these studies, we expect Lagflow*Buy to be positive and statistically significant if lagged fund flow is associated with greater trading immediacy (and therefore higher transaction costs) by funds. We follow Chiyachantana and Jain (2009) and use the ex post measure, Informed, to denote trades that may contain more information, thereby generating greater price impact and excess return.
5
Our model also includes a time trend, fund ability, and stock style differences in transactions (and alpha). Dayid is a trend variable to control for falling brokerage and implicit transaction costs. 6 The use of fund fixed effects is motivated by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) who use univariate analysis to demonstrate price impact differences between growth and value funds. In addition, Keim and Madhavan (1997) four book-to-market, and three momentum bins)).
Results
Our analysis of broker trade packages proceeds as follows. In section 4.1 we report descriptive statistics and provide an overview of the funds and their broker package trades. We then examine changes to the brokerage industry during our sample period. In section 4.2 we give yearly summaries of brokerage rates, broker revenue, and broker competition. In section 4.3 we use estimate based on expression (5) to test H1. This allows us to explore the link between brokerage rates and our performance measures (implicit transaction costs and alpha) across our funds (active or passive) and sample periods (P1 and P2). In section 4.4 we test H2 and H3 by considering differences in Brokerage coefficient estimates. We link these differences to package characteristics based on fund type (P1 active relative to P1 passive funds) and period (P1 active relative to P2 active funds). We test the robustness of our results by considering whether brokerage relations outlined in sections 4.3 and 4.4 hold cross-sectionally with Fama-MacBeth regression analysis (in section 4.5). Finally, we test whether the residuals of our baseline regression have any subsequent explanatory power (section 4.6). This gives us information on the extent to which the model of equation (5) accounts account for sources of variation in our performance measures. and ExcessReturns t+254 values are lower for P2 active funds than P1 active funds. Our regression analysis investigates in more detail the relation between brokerage paid and both alpha and implicit transaction costs. Finally, the standard deviation of Brokerage (equally weighted) is roughly half of average Brokerage; this suggests that there is significant scope for Brokerage to explain our Performance variables.
Descriptive Statistics
Broker Revenue and Competition
In this section we investigate whether brokers had declining revenue with lower institutional brokerage rates. We are also interested in whether there are any changes to the broker concentration, i.e. whether changing broker revenue appears to be linked to a changing competitive environment.
For each year we calculate the value-weighted brokerage rate of active funds and the total ASX on-market turnover. From these values we compute geometric (log) growth rates of year-on-year brokerage rates, turnover, and implied broker revenue. 
Regression Results
In this section we examine whether brokerage paid (as a percent of trade value) is related to either post trade alpha or implicit transaction costs. We find evidence consistent with H1 for index funds and P2 active funds; brokerage is negatively related to implicit transaction costs.
Also consistent with H1, P1 and P2 active fund brokerage is positively related to alpha (albeit short-term alpha benefits to P2 active funds and long-term alpha benefits to P1 active funds). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The control variables across all funds are mostly of the expected sign and are statistically significant across the four panels. For example for PriceImpact in Table 3 We also find that the longer a fund takes to complete a trade package the greater is PriceImpact but the lower is TradetoVWAP. Package duration (Days) is positive and statistically significant across fund samples for PriceImpact. This findings is similar to Chiyachantana et al. (2004) who suggest longer duration trades tend to be worked orders that are more difficult to trade. For TradetoVWAP, longer package duration is associated with statistically significant lower costs for P1 and P2 active funds, consistent with trading patience. The discrepancy between these two measures may be because PriceImpact is measured over several days for a trade package (and so allows for the price to drift from day to day), while TradetoVWAP uses the daily VWAP as the benchmark for each day traded in a broker trade package. As such it appears that P1 and P2 active funds beat daily VWAP more easily with trade packages of longer duration, however at the cost of higher PriceImpact when benchmarked by the opening price at the start of the trade package.
We find evidence that transaction costs are sensitive to brokerage, which is consistent with H1 that brokerage is an important factor in assessing implicit transaction costs. 10 For
PriceImpact, the coefficient of Brokerage is negative and statistically significant for our P1
passive and P2 active funds. For TradetoVWAP it is negative and statistically significant for P1
passive and P2 active funds, although positive and statistically significant for P1 active funds. Meanwhile, it appears that P1 passive and P2 active funds derive most benefit from brokerage through transaction cost recovery. For P2 active funds, the significant PriceImpact and shortterm alpha Brokerage coefficients suggest a combined benefit through alpha and implicit 10 Removing trade packages with brokerage rates of one basis point or less did not quantitatively change our results. 
Brokerage Effects across Samples
To test H2 and H3 we consider whether the relation between brokerage and the performance measures (alpha or implicit transaction costs) differs between P1 active funds, P1
passive funds, and P2 active funds. We find evidence consistent with H2 that index funds benefit more from brokerage with lower implicit transaction costs than active funds. Also consistent with H3, P2 active funds benefit more from brokerage than P1 active funds with lower implicit transaction costs.
To assess the statistical significance of the differences noted above we re-compute the regression in equation (5) We report the significance of these interacted explanatory variables in Table 3 (we do not report updated parameter estimates). We denote statistical significance of the interacted coefficients by adding a, b, or c to the reported P1 passive or P2 active regression specifications.
These denote statistically significant differences from the P1 active coefficients at the one, five and ten percent levels, respectively.
Between P1 passive and P1 active funds, we find there is a statistically significant interacted Brokerage coefficient at the ten percent level for both PriceImpact (Table 3 Panel A) and TradetoVWAP (Table 3 Panel B) . These results provide weak evidence for H2 that passive funds are better able to influence implicit transaction costs through brokerage than are active funds. Between P1 active and P2 active funds, the interacted Brokerage coefficients for both PriceImpact (Table 3 Panel A) and TradetoVWAP (Table 3 Panel B) is statistically significant at the one percent level.
We find no statistically significant interacted Brokerage coefficients for either of the excess return performance measures. For trade characteristics, we find that P1 active funds trade more complex packages at lower transaction costs and achieve higher long-term alpha than P1 passive funds and P2 active funds. This is evident by the significantly different interacted
Complex coefficients for P1 active relative to P1 passive funds. That is, coefficients are significantly smaller for implicit transaction cost regressions and larger for ExcessReturns t+254 regressions. Our findings are consistent with H3, where we expected lower brokerage rates in the P2 sample to improve the relation between Brokerage and our implicit transaction cost measures. Combined with the individual regression results, it appears that P2 active funds receive relatively better transaction cost services for brokerage spent than P1 active funds.
Quarterly Fama-MacBeth Analysis
Our base results show that the P1 passive funds and P2 active funds value broker transaction services differently and that there is some evidence P1 active funds value broker advisory services, as measured by trade package alpha. However this may be a statistical artifact of our time period rather than a cross-sectional relation. Fama-MacBeth regression results are reported in Table 4 . These are consistent with our main results that P1 active funds benefit from long-term alpha for brokerage paid, while P2 active funds benefit from short-term alpha and lower implicit transaction costs. P2 active funds benefit more from lower implicit transaction costs for brokerage paid than P1 active funds. Brokerage effects for our two alpha specifications. These results are generally consistent with the pooled regression significance results from Table 3 .
For PriceImpact specifications we find P1 active funds have an average Brokerage coefficient of -0.005, which is statistically insignificant. This suggests that no PriceImpact benefit is derived from brokerage paid in the P1 sample. P2 active funds have an average
Brokerage coefficient of -0.421 for the PriceImpact measure, which is statistically significant at the five percent level. 12 However we do not find a statistically significant difference between the P1 and P2 active fund coefficients for the PriceImpact measure.
For our alternative transaction cost measure, TradetoVWAP the coefficient estimates are similar to the results reported in Table 3 . The difference in coefficients for P1 and P2 active funds is statistically significant at the one percent level.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Results using the ExcessReturns t+20 performance measure are reported in Table 4 Panel B. We find P2 active funds have a positive and weakly statistically significant average Brokerage coefficient of 1.063 which is similar in magnitude, although lacking in statistical significance, to the value of 1.207 reported in Table 3 Panel B.
Finally for ExcessReturns t+254 we find P1 active funds have an average Brokerage coefficient of 6.460 which is statistically significant at the ten percent level. Also, the difference between the coefficients of P1 and P2 active funds ('P1 Active -P2 Active') is statistically significant at the five percent level.
The Fama-MacBeth excess return results provide further evidence that P1 active funds are valuing brokerage through long-term alpha rather than through transaction cost recovery. P2
active funds obtain value from transaction cost recovery and short-term alpha.
Overall the Fama-MacBeth results reinforce our pooled regression estimate of statistical significance while confirming that estimates reported in Table 3 do not appear to be a consequence of inter-temporal variation in brokerage costs.
Quarterly Fund and Broker Transaction Cost Contributions
The findings from our regression and Fama-MacBeth tests show that price impact and alpha are related to brokerage. However we do not directly test whether individual broker ability may be responsible for improving price impact or trade alpha. If individual brokers or fund managers are able to have lower price impact or improve the alpha of trades (controlling for trade characteristics) then simply paying higher brokerage may not be a valuable way of improving price impact or alpha. That is, the variation in outcome might be broker or fund specific. In this section we investigate how brokers and fund managers contribute to transaction costs beyond what is captured through the Brokerage regression variable, as well as through our control variables. This also serves as a diagnostic to our basic regression -do our regression residuals suggest additional, relevant broker or fund related features associated with our performance measures.
We calculate transaction cost contributions of both brokers and active fund trades across the two sample periods using a method similar to Anand et al. (2012) . 13 We calculate the residual performance measure for each trade package (price impact or alpha) after controlling for trade characteristics. The residual price impact reflects the broker or fund manager's ability to lower (or increase) price impact beyond what is expected by the characteristics of the trade.
For example, if the average residual price impact across trades by a broker is negative then the broker has shown ability to lower price impact. Broker transaction cost contributions are calculated using a two-step procedure. First, we compute residuals from the regression of a broker package's PriceImpact or TradetoVWAP cost against our explanatory variables and fund fixed effects for every quarter. In the second step, we regress these residuals on broker fixed effects and take the estimated coefficients for each broker as their transaction cost contribution for each of the trade packages that they execute. The broker transaction cost contribution for a given quarter is the broker's trade package value weighted average transaction cost contribution.
For fund transaction cost contributions, we first use broker (instead of fund) fixed effects followed by regressing the residuals on fund fixed effects in the second step. Table 5 reports the average quarterly broker and fund transaction cost contributions. We find that brokers do not generate economically or statistically significant differences in implicit transaction costs, beyond those based on our control variables. P2 active broker contribution for
TradetoVWAP is statistically significant at the five percent level. However, it is an economically insignificant -0.3 basis points per quarter.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
In contrast, fund transaction cost contributions are mostly statistically significant at the one percent level for both P1 and P2 active funds. For Price Impact, P2 funds have less than half the price impact of P1 active funds (0.109 versus 0.252), with the difference being statistically significant at the five percent level. For Trade to VWAP, P1 active funds contribute 9.8 basis points per quarter while P2 active funds save 4.1 basis points per quarter, with the difference between the samples being statistically significant at the one percent level.
For the alpha results in Table 5 Panel B, we find P1 and P2 active fund contributions for Excess Returns t+20 being statistically significant at the ten and five percent level, respectively.
However the P1 Active -P2 Active difference is not statistically significant.
Overall, the main contributor to variation in incremental transaction costs is the funds themselves with the P2 sample experiencing lower transaction costs. Specific brokers do not provide additional contributions to alpha and implicit transaction costs. This suggests that the brokerage coefficient in our transaction cost and alpha regressions captures the value of brokerage. It also suggests that, while brokers appear to provide valuable transaction and investment services, there is no strong evidence of broker-specific differences in this value.
Conclusion
We examine whether brokers provide valuable transaction services that are both scrutinized and valued by their clients. Using the trades of active and passive fund managers we do not find that active investors in our early sample period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) value the implicit transaction services of brokers. Across two implicit transaction cost measures we find either no statistically significant relation to brokerage costs, and or significantly higher implicit transactions costs with higher brokerage rates. We find weak evidence that active fund brokerage is positively related to abnormal returns over a one year period, suggesting that higher brokerage fees may be related to valuable ancillary brokerage services. Passive funds in the same period have weakly significant, negative relation between brokerage rates and implicit transaction costs, consistent with better trade execution with higher brokerage.
In the lower brokerage rate environment from 2002 to 2010, the implicit transaction cost measures for our sample of active funds exhibit a highly statistically significant and negative relation to brokerage. The estimated coefficients indicate that at 54.5 percent of brokerage payments are recouped through lower implicit transaction costs. In addition, short-term alpha improvements are estimated to be 120.7 percent of brokerage paid. The finding is robust to a quarterly Fama-MacBeth regression framework, which accounts for differences in trading ability over time. In summary, we find that brokers have become even more relevant in providing transaction services in the recent low brokerage environment.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
The table reports various descriptive statistics of fund trade packages from the Portfolio Analytics Database. 'P1 Passive' and 'P1 Active' refer to funds obtained from the first survey request from January 1995 to December 2001 while 'P2 Active' funds are from the second survey request from January 2002 to December 2010. Passive funds comprise index and enhanced index funds while active funds are those that select stocks. A broker trade package is defined by consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with trades being less than a five-day gap apart by the same broker for a given fund. Mean monthly fund size is the time series average mean month-end fund size. Mean monthly turnover ratio is the time series average monthly turnover ratio. The annual turnover ratio is the sum of buy and sell trade values divided by two in a month as a percentage of the total month-end fund size multiplied by twelve. Mean monthly brokers per fund is the time series average monthly mean number of brokers used per month per fund. ' . 'ASX Turnover' is the dollar value of on-market buy and sell trades divided by two. 'Brokerage Log Growth' is the natural log of the current year's brokerage over the prior year's brokerage. 'Turnover Log Growth' is the natural log of the current year's market turnover over the prior year's market turnover. 'Revenue Log Growth' is Brokerage Log Growth plus Turnover Log Growth. Broker HHI ASX Trades is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of broker trades on the ASX. Broker HHI PAD Trades is the HHI of PAD trade based on the executing brokers. The table reports the regression coefficient estimates of broker trade package transaction costs from fund manager trades in the Portfolio Analytics Database as the dependent variable against explanatory variables. A broker trade package is defined by consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with trades being less than a five-day gap apart by the same broker for a given fund. 'P1 Passive' and 'P1 Active' refer to funds obtained from the first survey request from January 1995 to December 2001 while 'P2 Active' funds are from the second survey request from January 2002 to December 2010. Passive funds consist of index and enhanced index funds while active funds are those that select stocks. Clustered standard errors by the start date of a trade package are used. Descriptions of explanatory variables are in the Appendix. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. a, b, c denote that brokerage, complex, volatility or days coefficients are statistically different to the P1 Active coefficient at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. The table reports average quarterly Fama-MacBeth coefficients of Brokerage from regressing transaction cost variables on explanatory variables. The sample contains active funds from the first survey request from January 1995 to December 2001 ('P1 Active') and active funds from the second survey request from January 2002 to December 2010 ('P2 Active') from the Portfolio Analytics Database. A broker trade package is defined by consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with trades being less than a five-day gap apart by the same broker for a given fund. Transaction cost measures are described in section 3.3 and are in percentages. Explanatory variables are described in the Appendix. Newey-West standard errors with three lags are used to adjust the tstatistics. t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Year
Panel
Panel A. Transaction Cost Measures
PriceImpact Broker transaction cost contributions are calculated using a two-step procedure. Firstly every quarter, we obtain the residuals from the regression of a broker package's Price Impact or Trade to VWAP cost against our explanatory variables and fund fixed effects. In the second step we regress these residuals on broker fixed effects and take the estimated coefficients for each broker as their transaction cost contribution for each of the trade packages that they execute. The broker transaction cost contribution in a given quarter is the broker trade package value weighted average broker transaction cost contribution. For fund transaction cost contributions, we first use broker (instead of fund) fixed effects followed by regressing the residuals on fund fixed effects in the second step. The sample contains active funds from the first survey request from January 1995 to December 2001 ('P1 active') and active funds from the second survey request from January 2002 to December 2010 ('P2 active') from the Portfolio Analytics Database. A broker trade package is defined by consecutive trades in the same direction for a stock with trades being less than a five-day gap apart by the same broker for a given fund. Transaction cost measures are described in section 3.3 and are in percentages. The table reports average quarterly active fund and broker transaction cost contributions for P1 active, P2 active and their differences. Explanatory variables are described in the Appendix. Newey-West standard errors with three lags are used to adjust the t-statistics. t-statistics are in parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
PriceImpact 
